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Purpose: Using a case study of comment letters, our purpose is to examine the debate about fair 
value in accounting which has arisen in the context of the current financial crisis.  
 
Methodology: We followed a rather qualitative approach while developing a flow chart in order 
to categorize and analyze our empirical material.  
 
Empirical foundation: Case Study through Analysis of Comment Letters 
 
Conclusion: The major conclusion that can be drawn from the study is that there is no strong 
relationship between the main groups and the opinion groups. The different views rather depend 
on specific industries. All the different opinion groups share the main view that fair value 
accounting needs improvements and major changes. These views and the expert debate can 
easily be looked at as a way to add to the already existing political pressures. 
 
We would like to thank our supervisor Anne Loft and Niklas Sandell providing support and 
guidance throughout our work.   
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1. INTRODUCTION  
This Chapter presents the problem area which will be discussed in this thesis. It introduces a 
review of the background and problem area followed by a purpose.  
 
1.1 Background 
 
World leaders gathered in London at the G-20 Leaders’ Summit on Financial Markets and the 
Word Economy, on April 2, 2009, to address the recent global financial crisis, which has been 
the worst crisis in generations since the Great Depression. 
 
Although there are many factors that led to the global financial crisis, experts point out three 
particular interrelated causes: 1) Rapid growth and subsequent collapse of U.S. house prices; 2) a 
general decline in mortgage underwriting standards, reflected in a growing proportion of home 
purchases financed by nonprime mortgages; and 3) widespread mismanagement of financial 
risks by firms engaged in mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, derivative financial 
instruments, and in particular the confusion behind Fair Value accounting. (Bullard, 2008) 
 
Thus, the discussion on the financial crisis is of particular importance to the banking industry.  
Changes in market value of securities have had a tremendous impact on financial statements. The 
complexity of the particular instruments made it hard to get insight into the underlying financial 
data. As a result, the markets seized and the panic contributed to the active trading in many 
instruments to almost stop. During this time some of the most prestigious financial institutions in 
the world started to declare enormous write-downs. 
 
The global financial crisis can be traced back to the ultimate starting point to an exceedingly 
indebted US economy. The crisis originated in 2006 due to the collapse in the real estate market, 
where failure was caused by the misapplication of risk controls for bad debts. Subprime 
mortgage loans which are granted to borrowers with a low credit or income, became apparent in 
2007 as mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures dramatically began to rise in the US. 
 
Banks as well as other financial institutions began to experience enormous amount of losses on 
residential mortgage and mortgage-backed securities.  Towards the end of 2007, investors were 
less willing to bear credit risks and the loss of confidence in banks and other financial institutions 
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increased. At that point banks intensified their lending standards, which reduced the accessibility 
to loans. As investors withheld to the safety of government bonds and other low-risk securities, 
the market gave up on risky debt securities relative to yields on U.S Treasury securities. 
Investors’ concerns intensified during 2008 as financial losses continued to rise. 
 
The below table shows a timeline of events of the Financial Crisis during 2007-2009 
 
Timeline of Financial Crisis 2007-2009 
Date Events 
2007   
Feb-March 
U.S. subprime industry collapse; several subprime lenders declaring bankruptcy, announcing significant 
losses, or putting themselves up for sale. 
April New Century Financial, largest U.S subprime lender, files for chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
June 
Merrill Lynch seized $800 million in assets from two Bear Stearns hedge funds that were involved in 
securities backed by subprime loans. 
August 
Worldwide "credit crunch" as subprime mortgage backed securities are discovered in portfolios of banks 
and hedge funds around the world. 
October 
Merrill Lynch announces a US$5.5 billion loss as a consequence of the subprime crisis, which is revised to 
$8.4 billion on October 24. 
2008   
March Collapse of Bear Sterns 
June 
Ex-Bear Stearns fund managers arrested by FBI Ex-Bear Stearns fund managers arrested by the FBI for 
their allegedly fraudulent role in the subprime mortgage collapse.  
July Major banks and financial institutions report loses approximately $435 billion 
September 
Global financial crisis: Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Troubled Assets Relief Program, 
Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, Feds take over Fannie Mae and Freddi Mac, etc. 
November G7 meet to address the global financial crisis  
2009   
January Lawmakers propose massive bailout of U.S banks 
Feb - March JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup announce temporary moratorium n residential foreclosures. 
March 
US FDIC, Federal Reserve and Treasury Dept. Announce Public-Private Investment Program to leverage 
$75-$100 billion of TARP funds with private capital to purchase $500 billion of Legacy Assets (a.k.a. Toxic 
assets. 
April G20 meet in London to address the global financial crisis 
 
In March 2008, the collapse of Bear Sterns Companies Inc., one of the largest global investment 
banks and securities trading and brokerage firms, led the financial community into uncertainty of 
what were to follow. Specifically, the uncertainty lay in the valuation of the mortgage-backed 
financial instruments, which were vital to the subprime mortgage crisis. In September 2008, the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, also referred to as the bailout of U.S. financial 
system was released. Bad assets, especially mortgage-backed securities were purchased. The Act 
was released to reduce uncertainty regarding the value of the remaining assets and to restore 
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confidence in the credit markets. In March 2008, Lehman brothers, a global financial services 
fund filed bankruptcy as they were faced with huge losses in lower-rated mortgage-backed 
securities during the continuing subprime mortgage crisis. 
 
In February 2009, JP Morgan Chase, one of the leaders in financial services and Citigroup 
announced a temporary ban on residential foreclosures in light of the financial crisis. More 
recently, in March 2009, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department announced the 
Public-Private Investment Program to leverage $75-$100 billion of funds with private capital to 
purchase $500 billion of Legacy Assets (Toxic assets). 
 
Default rates on subprime mortgage are not the only fault of rigorousness of the crisis. To a 
certain extent, high risk and low-quality mortgage acted as an accelerant to the extremity that 
spread through the entire economic system and became responsive as a result of several factors 
that are unique to this crisis. One of these factors is the application of fair value accounting.  
 Due to the instability in the market, financial institutions were faced with having to raise more 
capital. As time passed, the credit markets froze, the stock market declined even more and the 
investors reacted by looking for someone or something to blame. As the subprime market 
declined, firms reported losses related to the decrease in the fair value of assets, thus fair value 
accounting quickly emerged as a problem. Attempts are continuously made to blame accounting 
standards, rather than other possible factor such as the following: 
- Borrowers who sought credit beyond their reach.  
- Originators who wrote subprime mortgages to collect fees. 
- Investment bankers who earned fees for bundling and selling vaporous bonds 
without adequately disclosing risk. 
- Institutional investors who sought high returns without understanding the risk and 
real value. 
 
1.1.1 The start of the crisis - Subprime Mortgage 
 
 The last few years have showed a dramatic growth in the global capital market and the global 
economy has gained new peaks within the industrial markets. Like never before, consumers 
devoured and company revenues showed an all-time high record. Furthermore, consumers had 
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engaged themselves in mortgage loans. While the economy seemed to be growing by showing 
attractive housing prices, a disturbing situation occurred – the subprime mortgage crisis. Sub-
mortgage loans have been the recent cause of the dramatic increase of delinquency and default in 
the United States.  
 
A subprime mortgage is a type of loan granted to individuals with high risks which involve poor 
credit records or heavy debts. As a result of the poor credit history, individuals would actually 
not be qualified for a conventional mortgage loan. Due to subprime mortgage borrowers 
providing higher risk for lenders, interest rates for subprime mortgages are above the prime 
lending rate. Thus, the loans typically charge two to three percentage points more than those to 
people with less-risky credit profiles. This market has been ruthless due to non-payments and 
delinquencies.  
 
Due to the higher interest rates, borrowers have not been able to make the larger payments 
required. Concurrently, the value of their underlying assets, their houses, have declined and 
hence the ability to either refinance the loan or sell their home at a sufficient amount is vanished. 
The subprime-mortgage loan faults have initiated a credit crisis that, by corruption, covers many 
other segments of the credit market. Due to the uncertainty of the extent and allocation of the 
loans, the valuation of many other structured-finance products is now under great pressure. A 
consequence of the leveraged structure is that actors that are hit lose largely. Some of the largest 
subprime lenders have filed for bankruptcy as a result of the credit. The subprime mortgage 
market has been astringent due to non-payments and delinquencies. As a result, a number of 
accounting-related accusations have been made against mortgage originators in recent subprime 
lawsuits.  
 
1.1.2 IASB and FASB response to the crisis 
 
In response to the global financial crisis and recommendations made by the G20 leaders, the 
world’s two accounting standard-setting bodies, International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) commit to bring transparency to 
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investors and to clarify International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) to address new 
market developments. 
 
IASB is an independent standard-setting body based out of London U.K. which is responsible for 
developing the IFRS and promoting the use and application of these standards. FASB is a private 
standard-setting organization designated by the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) to 
develop the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) within the United States. The 
SEC is an independent U.S. government agency whose primary responsibility is enforcing the 
federal securities laws and regulating the securities industry, the nation’s stock and options 
exchange, and other electronic securities markets. (www.iasb.org, www.fasb.org, and 
www.sec.gov). Together, FASB and IASB directly and indirectly sets accounting standards for a 
very large number of public entities in the world.  
 
As part of IASB’s and FASB’s long-standing commitment, accounting issues emerging from the 
global crisis are addressed by both Boards. The Boards established an advisory group called the 
Financial Crisis Advisory Group (FCAG), which consists of senior leaders with a broad 
international experience in financial markets to advise the boards about financial reporting issues 
arising from the global financial crisis and potential changes to the global regulatory 
environment (www.iasb.org) 
 
Mid-2008, IASB formed an Expert Advisory Panel to identify valuation, disclosure and fair 
value issues in illiquid markets. After a six panel meetings the IASB issued draft report from 
Expert Advisory Panel. In late 2008 IASB provided update on applying fair value and in 
addition, published educational guidance on the applications of fair value measurement in 
inactive markets. Both IASB and FASB held their first round table on the global financial crisis 
in London on November 14, 2008 and then later IASB requested input on guidance regarding 
fair value measurement and impairments of financial instruments proposed by FASB. 
 
The FCAG has been working on many issues relating to fair value accounting. They have been 
debating whether fair value promotes financial stability or not, even if the risk is the loss of some 
transparency.  There is an agreement that because fair value account is pro-cyclical, it has been 
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contributed to the financial crisis. However, some FCAG member consider accounting for off-
balance items as securitizations and other structured entities have been the real cause behind the 
financial crisis than fair value accounting. The FCAG is asking for feedback and comments from 
experts on related issues as well as on how IFRS and U.S. GAAP enhanced in the area of fair 
value due to the current complexity of the reporting of financial instruments under these two 
standards. (Financial Times, May 19, 2009) 
 
The table below lists IASB’s and FASB’s response to the financial crisis during 2008-2009. 
 
IASB's and FASB's Response to the Financial Crisis 2008-2009 
Date Events 
2009   
April IASB and FASB Responds to G20 Recommendations and US GAAP Guidance 
March IASB and FASB announce further steps in response to global financial crisis 
  IASB and FASB launch public consultation on a future standard on lease accounting 
  IASB seeks input on  FASB guidance regarding FV measurement and impairments of financial instruments 
  Financial Crisis Advisory Group 3rd meeting 
February Financial Crisis Advisory Group 2nd meeting 
January IASB and FASB form the Financial Crisis Advisory Group (FCAG) 
  First meeting of the Financial Crisis Advisory Group to take place in London 
2008   
December IASB and FASB announce membership of Financial Crisis Advisory Group 
November  Advisory group considering financial reporting issues arising from global economic crisis  
  IASB and FASB announce dates for US and Asian round-tables on global financial crisis  
  IASB and FASB to hold first round table on global financial crisis in London on 14 November 2008  
October IASB publishes educational guidance on the application of FV measurement when markets become inactive  
  
IASB and FASB commit to a global approach to enhance market confidence, rapid appointment of members of 
the advisory group and the organization of three round tables 
  IASB and FASB to create an advisory group to review reporting issues related to credit crisis 
  IASB proposes improvements to disclosures and provides update on applying FV in inactive markets  
  Trustees express their support of IASB’s accelerated steps on the credit crisis  
  
IASB staff confirm clarification by the SEC staff and the FASB staff is consistent with IAS 39 Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement  
September IASB organizes round-table discussion of the revised staff proposal of an exposure draft on Consolidation 
  
Six panel meetings the IASB issues draft report from expert advisory panel and provides an update on 
response to the credit crisis  
August Expert Advisory Panel on fair value in illiquid markets discusses disclosure requirements 
July Staff presents a first staff draft of an exposure draft of a standard on consolidation to the Board  
June Expert Advisory Panel on fair value in illiquid markets meets for the first time 
  Forming of the Expert Advisory Panel to identify valuation and disclosure issues in illiquid markets 
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The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) created in April 1999, is also working towards international 
stability in the economy. FSF seeks information through exchange and international co-operation 
in financial supervision and surveillance. Their recent projects include recommendations and 
principles to strengthen the financial system. In 2009, the FSF issued reports called The role of 
valuation and leverage in procyclicality, which address how fair value measurement have been 
more widely used for financial reporting purposes. At the same time, mark-to-market valuation 
techniques have become more widely used for risk management purposes (FSF, 2009).  
 
On February 2009, the SEC released a report addressing improvements in the fair value 
standards. The SEC encouraged improvements in accounting for impairments and the 
development of additional guidance for fair value accounting in inactive markets. The report 
further recommends decreasing models to report impairments, by providing investors additional 
information about current decline in value are consistent with credit quality with the restrictions 
on ability to record increase in value. 
 
At the same time, FASB issued the second of two FASB Staff Positions (FSPs) to address 
concerns arising from the current financial crisis relating to accounting for financial instruments. 
The proposed FSP is intended to apply to certain financial assets such as debt securities 
classified as held-to-maturity and available-for-sale, loans and long-term receivables not 
measured at fair value with changes in the fair value recognized through earnings. Furthermore, 
on May 1, 2009, the FASB Staff Positions (FSP) provided guidance on the fair value 
measurement of liabilities under FASB Statement No. 157, Fair Value Measurements 
(www.webcpa.com).  
 
1.3 Problem Area 
 
Problems related to fair value accounting have been discussed in a paper by Ernst & Young 
(2005).  The fair value model of the IASB is heavily criticized since the author thinks that 
allowing estimates for many assets and liabilities have so low reliability that the numbers are not 
relevant either.  
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“Fair value is a wonderfully powerful expression in the English language. It 
subliminally awakens all those feelings deep within us of wanting fair dealing and 
true worth to be recognized and appreciated. It conveys the very essence of truth 
and fairness: What possible objection can there be to financial statements that 
report assets and liabilities at their “fair value?” 
 
The author thinks that the standard setters sometimes are not using the term fair value in an 
understandable way. One example is that under the fair value hierarchy, managements own 
mathematical models will be used in cases where no market value is available for the asset or 
liability in question, as an estimate for “fair value”. In the center of all the other problems fair 
value accounting emerged again as the hot topic for change.  Because of the current events the 
participants in the fair value accounting debate increased and their arguments became even more 
sophisticated that further complicated the goal of a common understanding of fair value 
accounting and its conversion. In these arguments there are opponents that think fair value 
accounting is the cause of the financial crisis. Some argue that Fair Value accounting did not 
directly cause the crisis, but it helped fuel the crisis even more, so that the end result was a global 
financial crisis. According to the SEC mandated study, the causes extend into other areas and 
that fair value accounting did not appear to play a central role (SEC 2008). The SEC study 
received 186 comment letters as inputs to the study, compared to that FASB’ s 93 comment 
letters when issuing the SFAS No. 157 in 2006. The financial crisis has apparently triggered the 
debate and we are interested to look further into these problems.  
 
1.4 Purpose 
 
Using a case study of comment letters, our purpose is to examine the debate about fair value in 
accounting which has arisen in the context of the current financial crisis.  
 
-What major perceptions can be found in the fair value debate? 
-What types of arguments can be found in the comment letters? 
-Is there any relationship between the main groups and the opinion groups in the different 
comment letters that were sent to FASB, IASB and SEC? 
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1.5 Disposition  
 
INTRODUCTION - this chapter explains the background to our 
thesis 
 
 
 
 
FRAME OF REFERENCE- this chapter presents relevant 
concepts of accounting 
 
 
 
METHOD- this chapter explains our research approach 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERT DEBATE- this chapter presents our main and opinion 
groups 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS- this chapter presents the analysis of the comment 
letters 
 
 
 
 
    CONCLUSION – this chapter answers our research question 
 
 
 
 
POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH- this chapter 
introduces suggestion for a possible resolution of the problems 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
CHAPTER 6 
CHAPTER 1 
CHAPTER 3 
CHAPTER 4 
CHAPTER 5 
 
CHAPTER 7 
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In summary, the financial crisis started in the US subprime mortgage. The crisis in the US 
triggered an enormous amount of write-downs of toxic assets. These events led into a global 
financial crisis and increase in criticism to the fair value accounting standards. The response 
from the two standard setters, IASB and FASB, was the creation advisory panel that was 
cooperating together towards a possible resolution to the fair value debate. The next chapter 
presents the frame of references our thesis in order to explain the issues that are being debated.  
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2. FRAME OF REFERENCE 
This chapter presents the relevant accounting concepts to the debate, specifically the basic fair 
value measurement and fair value accounting issues that arose during the financial crisis.  
 
2.1 Fair value measurement and Historical cost 
 
Fair value accounting can be described as the practice of accounting that records certain assets 
and liabilities at their current market value (Hitz, 2007). However, this is the ideal situation on 
liquid and deep markets with ordinary transactions and products. FASB and IASB have the last 
years developed a methodology on how to determine the “ideal current market value”, even 
when no market exist. In order to understand the fair value accounting debate, one has to 
understand the basic measurement issue.  
 
There are several broad concepts for measurements including historical cost, current cost, net 
realizable value, present value of future cash flows, and current market value. Fair value 
accounting and historical cost refer to several different accounting concepts and measurement 
bases. Historical cost refers to different measurements bases relating to past entry price (SEC 
2008). Historical cost is more explicit the “amount of cash, or its equivalent, paid to acquire an 
asset or received when an obligation is incurred” (SEC, 2008). Usually, historical values are after 
recognition modified for impairment, depreciation or amortization. Fair Value is represented by 
measurements relating to the present; current entry price, current exit price, current equilibrium 
price, value in use, or even future exit or entry price (SEC 2008).  
 
Despite the different measurement basis, fair value accounting and historical cost relates to 
different accounting concepts (Nissim, Penman, 2008). Financial statements reveal numbers 
through the balance sheets and income statement. Income equals the change in equity in the 
balance sheet (other than transactions with owners). Financial statements consist of two bottom-
line numbers, net income in the income statement and book value of equity in the balance sheet. 
Determination of assets and liabilities also determines income, and vice versa. Accordingly, 
accounting based on asset and liability recognition and measurement in the balance sheet 
produces a residual income measure. Vice versa, accounting based on income measurement 
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produces a balance sheet as a residual. Historical cost accounting is associated with income 
determination. The underlying idea is that value is generated from a business plan that buys 
inputs and sells outputs for higher prices. Historical cost accounting does not report the present 
value of the business plan or the value of individual assets employed in the value adding process 
(Nissim, Penman, 2008). The income statement conveys information about the (realized) value 
added transactions performed by the company in a specific period, (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004). The 
value of the business is determined by projections of future earnings or cash flows based on the 
realized value added transactions (Nissim, Penman, 2008). Under the asset/liability accounting 
model, the income statement shows revaluations of assets and liabilities from one period to 
another, often referred to as economic income (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004). The balance sheet is made 
up with current market values while earnings are uninformative about future earnings and about 
value. Under this model, the balance sheet consists of values of individual assets and liabilities. 
No income measurement is needed, the income statement will instead inform about value at risk. 
The conceptual problem is that even if individual assets and liabilities may have identifiable 
prices, those prices may not represent value since every business manage assets and liabilities 
according to a business plan, not individually (Nissim, Penman, 2008). As standard setters 
gradually adopted an asset/liability view with focus on the balance sheet values, the concept of 
historical prices do not fit in well (Hitz, 2007). FASB have been the leading standard setter in 
developing the current Fair Value measurement methodology. Next section will explain the 
concept in detail.  
 
2.1.1 US GAAP Version 
 
 The core of the recent debate about fair value accounting goes back to SFAS No.157. The 
standard provides definitions of the fair value accounting concept and a methodology to reach 
the ideal market price. SFAS No. 157 paragraph 5 defines Fair Value as:  
 
“Fair Value is the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a 
liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement 
date” 
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The objective is to determine the ideal, hypothetical exit price that would be settled at the 
measurement date (SEC, 2008). Market participants are assumed to be independent, 
knowledgeable, able to transact and willing (SFAS No.157, paragraph10). The exchange is 
assumed to be an orderly transaction, it is not a distressed sale or forced transaction. If the entity 
operates in several markets the reference market is the most advantageous one. A Fair Value 
measurement assumes the highest and best possible use of an asset. Transaction cost shall be 
considered when determining the most advantageous market but the price itself should not be 
adjusted for transaction costs (SFAS No.157, paragraph.9). The asset or liability might be a 
standalone asset or liability or a group of assets and/or liabilities, or even a reporting unit. 
Liabilities must be adjusted for credit and liquidity risks if market participants would include that 
in their pricing models. SFAS No.157 describes three different valuation techniques; the market 
approach, the income approach and the cost approach (SFAS No.157 paragraph.18). The market 
approach is based on quoted prices and other information involving identical or comparable 
assets or liabilities. The income approach uses valuation techniques to convert future cash flows 
or earnings to a single present amount. The cost approach considers the amount that would be 
required to replace an asset’s service capacity adjusted for obsolescence (a broader concept than 
depreciation). 
 
FASB have also developed a fair value hierarchy for inputs used in the different valuation 
techniques.  The hierarchy consists of three different levels; level 1, level 2 and level 3 estimates 
(SFAS 157 No.157, paragraph 22). Observable market information is preferred compared to 
company specific information. Accordingly, the fair value hierarchy gives the highest priority to 
market inputs that reflect quoted prices in active markets for identical assets and liabilities. 
Reaching fair values using market prices are commonly referred to as mark- to -market 
accounting (Ryan, 2008). Level 2 includes quoted prices of similar instruments in active markets, 
quoted prices for identical or similar instruments in inactive markets, or observable market 
information that differs from quoted prices, and finally it includes inputs derived from other 
market-corroborated data. Level 3 represents measurements that incorporate unobservable inputs 
that reflect the reporting entity’s own assumptions regarding future cash flow and interest rates 
(SFAS No.157, paragraph 24-31). Estimating fair values using level 3 inputs are commonly 
referred to as mark-to-model accounting (Ryan, 2008). The basic logic is that valuation 
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techniques used should maximize the use of relevant observable inputs and minimize the use of 
unobservable inputs (SFAS No.157, paragraph 21). Due to the financial crisis, more and more 
assets and liabilities have to be valued based on level 2 or level 3 inputs, causing preparers 
considerable problems (SEC, 2008). Mark-to-model requires judgment and the reliability of the 
outcome are totally dependent on the subjective assumptions used in the models. The SEC Chief 
Accountant together with FASB issued an immediate guidance (SEC, 2008). The guidance stated 
that in some cases using, unobservable inputs might be more appropriate than using observable 
inputs. FASB issued additional guidance by making amendments to SFAS No.157 (FASB, 
2009).  
 
FASB STAFF POSITION No.157-4 contains guidance’s on how to determine if a market is 
active and when a transaction is orderly or not. Among other indicators of a disorderly 
transaction, FSP No.157-4 p.16 c states that seller is in or near bankruptcy or receivership or the 
seller was required to sell to meet regulatory or legal requirements.  
 
2.1.2 IFRS version 
 
The FASB and IASB are since 2006 working on a joint program on converge Fair Value 
accounting (Memorandum of Understanding, 2006). IAS 40, paragraph 5 defines Fair Value as: 
 
“The amount for which an asset could be exchanged or a liability settled, between 
knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction” 
 
The definition differs in three important ways. The definition in SFAS 157 is explicitly an exit 
price. The definition in IFRSs is neither explicitly an exit price nor an entry price (SEC, 2008). 
Additionally, the definition in SFAS 157 explicitly refers to market participants. The definition 
in IFRSs refers to knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction. FASB: s Fair 
value definition is more of market-based measurement and IASB: s is more an entity-specific 
measurement. For liabilities, the definition in SFAS 157 refers to that the liability is transferred 
to counterparty; it is not assumed to be settled with the counterparty.  
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IASB Expert Advisory Panel, like FASB and SEC, opened up for the possibility that observable 
might not be representative to Fair Values. In such case, management estimation models might 
be used to adjust observable prices even if more weight should be place to observable market 
prices. IASB Expert Panel seems to have adopted a stricter view of the fair value hierarchy 
concept. For example, they state that transactions during bankruptcy should not automatically be 
assumed to be forced (IASB Expert Advisory Panel, 2008, paragraph 25). On the other hand, as 
noted above, FASB view the existence o a sale during a bankruptcy as an indicator of a 
disorderly transaction. Another example is that SEC and FASB (2008) state that transactions in 
inactive markets may be inputs when measuring fair value, but would likely not be 
determinative. IASB Expert Advisory Panel (2008) view is that transaction prices in inactive 
markets are likely to reflect market conditions. In inactive markets, entities should use a 
valuation technique considering both observable market prices but also unobservable data. It is 
not appropriate to conclude that all market activity in inactive markets represents forced 
transactions. An entity should not conclude automatically that any transaction price is 
determinative of fair value, although they state that observable transaction prices is likely to 
reflect current market conditions (IASB Expert Advisory Panel, 2008, p.18). Moreover, IASB 
Expert Advisory Panel (2008) also provided a definition of an active market. “An active market 
is one in which transactions are taking place regularly on an arm’s length basis”.  
 
In summary, the goal fair value measurement is to arrive at a hypothetical exit price between 
market participants using different valuation techniques. The fair value hierarchy concept 
concerns the level of reliability that generally can be placed on different inputs. The most reliable 
inputs are prices for identical assets in active markets. Internal estimations based on company-
specific information are the least preferable inputs. Due to the financial crisis, Fair Values are to 
a greater extent dependent on level 2 and level 3 inputs. FASB, IASB and SEC have been issuing 
additional guidance saying that unobservable inputs may be a better estimate of Fair Values in 
inactive markets, or when transactions appear to be distressed. FASB and SEC seem to be more 
open for changes in the fair value hierarchy concept than IASB.   
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3. METHOD 
This chapter describes the methods we used and the course of action we took to gather and put 
together information. 
 
3.1  The Qualitative Method 
 
Maxwell (2005) writes that several authors distinguish qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Some are fundamental and some actually have no explicit difference and that “dividing the two 
is false” as pointed out by Layder (1993). It is believed that the difference between a 
quantitative and a qualitative method lies in the way that they are actually used. Thus, when 
using a qualitative method entails usage of a collection of words, whereas using quantitative 
method involves a collection of numbers. Furthermore, the quantitative research is an inquiry 
into an identified problem, based on testing a theory measured with numbers, and analyzed 
using statistical techniques where researcher is done by using tools, such as questionnaires or 
equipment to collect numerical data. The general goal of quantitative method is to determine 
whether the predictive generalization of a theory hold true. On the other hand a study that is 
based upon a qualitative process has the goal of understanding a social or human problem from 
multiple perspectives and where the research is the data gathering instrument. 
Our approach lies in both the qualitative and the quantitative method. Bryman and Bell (2005) 
state that the qualitative method is generally used when trying to study some sort of 
phenomenon in getting a deeper understanding. They further point out that there is a close 
relationship between what is being researched and the researcher and how the behaviour of the 
researcher can affect outcome. Our approach through the analysis on the expert debates to 
provide a good overview on the subject matter and the collection of comment letters relates to 
both the qualitative as well as the quantitative method. The review of comment letters being the 
main focus of our thesis is data in form of words as related to a qualitative approach. The actual 
results in the number of letters for each group, which is in form of numbers, relates to the 
quantitative approach. Furthermore, qualitative research being subjective, where individuals’ 
interpretation of events is important, we have the comments in writing made by participants in 
observation of fair value. Quantitative approach is more objective and seeks precise 
measurement and analysis of target concepts, which again relates to the actual number of letters 
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in form in percentage (Ch. 5.1). Thus, this explains that ultimately we have taken advantage of 
using both approaches. 
3.2  Data Collection 
 
When collecting data, researchers often distinguish between primary or secondary data. Primary 
data is new data collected for the research while secondary data refers to date already collected. 
In our study, we primarily used primary data. The secondary sources used are process data such 
as research articles and books. The main and primary source of our data comprised of 218 
comment letters sent to FASB, IASB and SEC regarding the use of fair value during the financial 
crisis. In collecting the secondary sources, we used the public library online recourse, different 
financial and accounting newspapers and a variety of different articles from the web. The time 
frames for the resources were ten years. The articles that dated ten years back were used get a 
deeper understanding of the whole measurement debate. 
  
3.3  Our research approach 
 
This section is explaining how we approached the research on our thesis. The research evolved 
around different comment letters in order to help us gain a better understanding of the different 
viewpoints in the fair value accounting debate. The approach on itself started first with looking 
into the background of the different comment letters and then it emerged into finding different 
ways of executing out study. While examining how to execute the study we created a flow chart 
in order to be able to better analyze the letters. The subsections below explain our research 
method further.  
 
3.3.1 Background to the Comment Letters 
 
The SEC’s performed a study on mark-to-market accounting in late 2008 (SEC, 2008). The 
mandate for their study came from the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act which was signed 
into law on October 3, 2008. Section 133 of the Act mandates the SEC, in consultation with the 
Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall a study on mark-to-market accounting 
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standards (SEC, 2008). The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act mandated SEC to look into 
the following areas:  
 
1. The effects of such accounting standards on a financial institution’s balance sheet; 
2. The impacts of such accounting on bank failures in 2008; 
3. The impact of such standards on the quality of financial information available to 
investors; 
4. The process used by the Financial Accounting Standards Board in developing accounting 
standards; 
5. The advisability and feasibility of modifications to such standards; and 
6. Alternative accounting standards to those provided in such Statement Number 157.7 
 
The SEC requested the respondents to comment on these matters. The SEC received 186 
comment letters. The other 32 comment letters we have analyzed were sent to IASB and FASB 
as inputs to their three joint public roundtables in November and December 2008. Unlike the 
SEC study, these roundtables were more general in that sense that the purpose was to identify 
financial reporting issues that need more attention in the light of the global financial crisis. The 
SEC and FASB had in September 2008 issued their guidance of Fair Value accounting in 
inactive markets and IASB Expert Advisory Panel issued their guidance on the same matter in 
October 2008. Most of the comment letters therefore focused on the use of different valuation 
techniques. By consequence, definitions of active/inactive markets, orderly/disorderly 
transactions, related to the fair value hierarchy measurement concept are discussed in the 
comment letters. We have chosen the comment letters sent to SEC, FASB, and IASB because 
they represent the most controversial debate in accounting. Fair value accounting has been 
blamed for the financial crisis and the SEC can suspend the use of fair value accounting. 
Although the comment letters sent to SEC address more specific questions than the other 
comment letters, we believe all comment letters in general focus on the same issues. All the 
comment letters are comparable because they all express opinions about Fair Value accounting 
that enable us to see the issues from different angles.   
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3.3.2 Execution of the Study 
 
The comment letter were initially split up between two people and read through once. One 
person took the 14 letters that were sent to IASB and the other person took the 18 letters sent to 
FASB. After each person had read the letters, we switched and read the remaining once. We then 
debated about potential groups for classification. We started to divide the list of commenter’s on 
fair value accounting matters into six different groups. The list of commenter’s consists of 
preparers, users, auditors, standard setters, academics and other public opinions. The initial 
thought process for the group’s formation was to place certain general expectations for the 
comment letters. The preparers group includes preparers, preparer-related professional 
organizations and advisors to preparers. The user’s group included consultants, professional 
organization, investors and other related users. The auditor’s group consisted of the big four 
audit firms. The standard-setters group included different standard setting organizations. The 
academics group consisted of different academics from the US. The other public group included 
other private individuals that commented on issues without representing any specific area of 
business. The first initial groups we named main groups.  So, after finding the main groups we 
went back to the text, read the first set of comment letters and identified them according to which 
potential sub-categories we could classify them in. The further classifications were based on a set 
of questions that we developed while reading the comment letters. These groups received the 
name opinion groups. The opinions groups consisted out of groups that we called opponents, 
alternatives, and supporters of fair value, public interest opinion group, modifiers due to 
economic consequences and modifiers for other reasons. Once we had identified the opinion 
groups we wrote down a set of initial characteristics for each of the groups. We explain it more 
in detail in section 4.2. After this step we created a flow chart to give the readers a visual of our 
flow of opinion groups. The flow chart can be found in Figure 3.3.3  and more in detail in the 
next section.   
 
3.3.3 Our Flowchart (Figure 3.3.3) 
 
After having read all the comment letters, identified the criteria for the opinion groups and given 
our different opinion groups names, we created a flow chart. This chart’s serves as a visual tool 
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for better understanding of our approach to the study. First, we started asking ourselves if the 
comment letters expressed any concrete opinions about fair value and the financial crisis.  If they 
did not have any particular opinions or if they talked about a different topic, we separated them 
into a group that we called Irrelevant Views. If the letters had relevant opinions about Fair Value, 
we went a step further and asked the question if the comment letter’s promoted historical cost 
accounting. If they did express positive statements about historical cost accounting and if they 
provided a rather negative picture of fair value we categorized these letters as Opponents of fair 
value.  On the other hand if the letters were rather positive and expressed support and reasoning 
for fair value, these letters were set aside for further questioning. At that point, these letters 
represented a level one of our study where we could see a common support for the overall fair 
value concept. 
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After identifying the common supporters of fair value, we continued to further ask if any of the 
remaining letters supported fair value accounting in normal times. If the answer was no we 
placed them into an opinion group that we called alternative.  This opinion group had comment 
letters where they had rather very critical opinions for fair value even but they didn’t promote 
historical cost accounting. The remaining letters were asked further questions. We examined the 
letters while asking the question if these letters, even though they were supporting the Fair Value 
concept, were proposing modification to fair value. If they did not call for any modification we 
labeled them as Supporters of fair value, but if they did want more modifications we asked 
additional questions. In particular, we asked if these letters were specifically calling for 
modifications for the proposed Fair Value guidance’s, recently issued by the SEC/FASB and 
IASB (IASB Expert Advisory Panel, 2008, SEC Guidance 2008). If they did not want 
modifications to these guidance’s, they were fitted into the group of the Public Interest Opinion 
Group. The opinion group got the name Public Interest Opinion Group because they support the 
concept of fair value while criticizing it and still urge for fair value change other than the 
proposed guidelines. The last question we asked was whether the comment letters proposal was 
motivated by the current financial crisis.  If the letters that expressed their views in terms of the 
current financial crisis, fair value and the economic consequences it had, we categorized these 
letters into the group Modifiers due to economic consequences. This was not the case they were 
moved into the group of Modifiers for other reasons. Once we have all the letters separated into 
different opinion groups we were ready to continue to look into any possible relation between 
our main groups and the set opinion groups.   
 
3.4 Reliability and Validity 
 
The two most common measuring terms used in theses are reliability and validity. Reliability can 
be defined as the result of a process that produces consistent and predictable results that can be 
replicated (Martin 2005). In order to enhance the reliability of a process or a project, the number 
of variables should be reduced and a rather quantitative, bias-free measurement should be used 
(Ibid). But when one enhances the reliability while reducing the variables, one reduces the 
validity as well (Ibid). These two terms seam to conflict with each other, so it is important to find 
a good balance because a study without these two aspects is not possible.  
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To ensure reliability in qualitative research, examination of trustworthiness is crucial. Seale 
(1999), while establishing good quality studies through reliability and validity in qualitative 
research, states that the “trustworthiness of a research report lies at the heart of issues 
conventionally discussed as validity and reliability” (p. 266). When judging (testing) qualitative 
work, Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggest that the "usual canons of ‘good science’…require 
redefinition in order to fit the realities of qualitative research" (p. 250).  
 
In our thesis we used a lot of newspapers and government reports in order to assure that the 
source itself can be trusted. During our material gathering phase we came across a problem that 
not all the information that was written online could be said to be reliable and relevant.  In order 
to pick the best possible information available we place great caution where the information 
came from. When picking the newspaper articles we paid very close attention that the articles 
were from major newspaper agencies that had the reputation to be reliable source of information. 
On the other hand the government report was chosen because it was an SEC report that was 
mandated by the US Congress in order to look into the possible suspension of fair value 
accounting.  When picking the SEC report our reasoning went to the fact that SEC is a very well 
known and very powerful organization around the world, so its reports could be trusted to be 
reliable and valid.  
 
In our expert debate we have read and interpreted 218 comment letters. This particular procedure 
can be argued to be very subjective and therefore it only gives a certain degree of reliability to 
our debate. In this debate the reliability is dependent on the fact how the information is being 
interpreted. In our process two people have read all the comment letters twice independently and 
individually. After the reading all the comment letters we screened and separated the once that 
were hard to classify. Once everything was separated, we discussed all the possible group 
placements based on the initially set criteria. During the already mentioned process we created a 
flowchart diagram that was a guiding tool for the formation of the opinion groups. The flowchart 
added to our reliability because it was created to be asking clear cut questions where one was 
asked to answer these questions with yes or no. The flowchart played a central role to increasing 
our reliability. All these things were done in order to be certain that nothing was misunderstood 
or misclassified. With these procedures we wanted to uphold the relevance and reliability of our 
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study. Even with all the procedures and our best efforts to be very thorough there is always a risk 
that our own values and understandings affected how the comment letters were interpreted. The 
interpretation of the comment letter and the grouping was very critical in our study. It was very 
important that the grouping and interpretation of the main and opinion groups were done by 
several people at different times in order to be able to replicate the same results and so with that 
make the interpretation more reliable. One of the limitations of the grouping are that the main 
groups could be classified differently. For example, the main groups could be classified based on 
their respective industries or eventually countries. Our decision not to do so was based on time 
limitations and the fact that it could have made the topic more complex and more difficult to 
follow. We put a lot of effort, thoroughness and care to make sure all our research could be 
traced to reliable sources and process.  
 
In summary, we examined and analyzed different comment letters from SEC, FASB and IASB.  
This process was done with the aid of a flow chart that was design by us. The purpose of that 
was to find an effective way of analyzing the various comment letters.  This section gives the 
reader insights into how we approached the examination and analysis phase of our research.  The 
next chapter categorizes and explains the main and opinion groups. 
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4. EXPERT DEBATE 
In this chapter we will explain the empirical findings. It examines and explains the seven main 
and opinion groups. 
 
4.1 Our Main Groups 
 
In the accounting literature groups are normally divided into users, preparers, auditors, and 
academics. In our public debate we used these common groups to classify the 218 comment 
letters we have studied. In addition to these common groups we added standard setters and other 
public group to our classifications. The 218 comment letters were distributed according to the 
role in the economy the commentator represented, independently from their opinions in the 
comment letters. The main groups were added because we wanted to examine any potential 
differences in opinions between the groups.   
 
The preparer group consisted of those who prepare their own accounting information, preparer 
related professionals and organizations and advisors to preparers. This group mainly includes 
different companies across different industries. The banks and the financial institutions were also 
included in this section because they represent the predominant preparer of fair value accounting.   
 
The users group is mainly consisting of different individuals and companies that use and analyze 
the accounting information rather than prepare it. These groups primarily use the accounting 
information as a means to sound investment decisions, conducting company valuations and other 
similar tasks. For example the user’s group includes consultants, professional organizations, 
investors and other related users.   
 
The auditors group is the group that attests the annual reports. They also make sure that the 
financial statements and other accounting information are correct and follow the respective 
accounting principles. The standard setters on the other hand are the authoritative body that sets 
the rules and principles that the profession is obligated to follow. These groups were assigned 
groups of its own because of the roles the authoritative bodies play in the accounting industry.   
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The academics groups consist mainly of professors from different Universities. Because they do 
not fit into any of the other groups, but their input is important, they were assigned their own 
group. Also, their role in the accounting profession is a very critical one, since their contribution 
and their comments serve as an eye opener to other professionals.   
 
The other public group includes other private individuals that commented on issues without 
representing any specific area of business. This particular group was created to assign the 
individuals that do not fit into the other groups. In the Appendix I there is a full list of comment 
letters and their distributions between the six main groups. 
 
4.2 Opinion groups  
 
This section describes the different criteria’s that were used for the opinion groups and gives 
detailed examples from the comment letters in order to give a better understanding of the group 
formations.   
 
4.2.1 Irrelevant Views 
 
As the name already suggests this group was created because some comment letters do not 
provide any relevant or even educated views on the topic provided. This group mainly consists of 
irrelevant opinions that were not possible to classify. A good example is the opinion that 
ordinary taxpayer’s money has been used to bailout corrupt companies own mistakes. The views 
in this group were weeded out right from the beginning in order to be able to come to a relevant 
debate about the subject matter. For example the user’s group comment letters that were 
categorized into irrelevant views are portrayed below: 
 
“Please do away with mark to market valuation and restore mark to reality valuations 
(Mcallister 2008).” 
 
“YOU SAY YOU'RE PROTECTING THE INVESTOR. I GUESS SUING THEM DOESN'T 
COST MONEY. I, LIKE OTHERS, HAVE ALREADY LOST MY LIFE SAVINGS AND I 
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ONLY HAVE A FEW YEARS LEFT TO WORK, IF I LIVE THAT LONG. THE 
ILLUSTRIOUS GOVERNMENT BAILED OUT COMPANIES AT TAXPAYER EXPENSE. 
YOU AND ALL THE OTHER POLITICALLY CORRUPT GOVERNMENTAL PEOPLE 
CONTINUE TO SPEND MY TAXPAYER MONEY AND YOU DIDN'T EVEN FORCE THE 
GOLDEN PARACHUTISTS TO GO BANKRUPT AND TAKE EVERYTHING THEY 
HAD/HAVE TO REPAY THE INVESTORS. INSTEAD, YOU GAVE THEM MONEY--MY 
MONEY WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO FOR ALL THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE NO 
SAVINGS, PUT THEM IN A CONCENTRATION CAMP AND GASS THEM ALL? YEAH 
THE BABY BOOMERS WERE SUPPOSED TO BE ABLE TO RETIRE ON WHAT A 
PIECE OF PAPER THAT'S WORTHLESS? YOU AND OTHERS LIKE YOU SUCKED 
THE LIFEBLOOD OUT OF SOCIAL SECURITY. THANK YOU. AND NOW WE HAVE A 
MULTI TRILLION DOLLAR DEFICIT THAT NOBODY'S GOING TO BE ABLE TO PAY 
OFF. EVERYBODY IN GOVERNMENT IS ABLE TO CARRY A DEFICIT AT THE 
EXPENSE OF THE TAXPAYER BUT THE TAXPAYER IS EXPECTED TO MAINTAIN A 
BUDGET. WHY CAN'T YOU AND OTHERS LIKE YOU LIVE ON A BUDGET? WHO 
SPENT BEYOND THEIR MEANS (Bjork 2008).” 
 
4.2.2 Opponents of Fair Value 
 
This group consists of comment letters that take a negative stand to fair value accounting. This 
group’s negative perspective range not just to a specific area of fair value, but they extend into 
the whole concept of fair value. They also go so far as to blame Fair Value accounting for the 
financial crisis. The quote below from William M. Isaac, Chairman of the Secura Group of 
LECG and former Chairman of FDIC, illustrates a typical opinion of an opponent and a user of 
fair value. 
 
“I believe it is beyond dispute that mark-to-market accounting has been extremely 
and needlessly destructive of bank capital in the past year and is a major cause of 
the current credit crisis and economic downturn (ISAAC 2008, p.6).” 
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In addition to just putting blame on the fair value accounting concept, the comment letter 
propose an immediate abandonment of the concept and a return to historical cost accounting. 
These comment letters truly believe that the historical cost accounting is a better accounting 
model. For example William M. Isaac also says: 
 
“I believe the FASB and the SEC should immediately withdraw SFAS 157. 
Moreover, it is my fervent hope that the SEC will recommend in its report to 
Congress that we abandon mark-to-market accounting altogether (ISAAC 2008, 
p.6).” 
 
“Can we have a system that reflects market pricing while not eradicating earnings 
and masses of capital when the markets swing in one direction or another or are in 
disarray? I believe the historical-cost accounting model, which is the cornerstone 
of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, accomplished these objectives 
exceptionally well for decades before we decided to experiment with mark-to-
market accounting. Under historical-cost accounting, marketable assets are carried 
on the books of banks at their amortized cost, and the balance sheet contains 
footnoted tables showing the current market value of those portfolios (ISAAC 2008, 
p.7-8).” 
 
In these comment letters the opponent’s also argue that since fair value can only be implemented 
to a portion of the asset side of the balance sheet, fair value produces mismatched results. In 
addition, the group makes a point that the current practices of fair value accounting creates an 
enormous procyclicality effect which ultimately leads to distorted and obscured values.  William 
M. Isaac also argues:  
 
“This historical-cost system does not run the market depreciation through the profit 
and loss statement and does not deplete capital (unless the diminution in value is 
considered permanent). Moreover, this system does not value one portion of the 
balance sheet without regard to the rest of the balance sheet. In short, it presents a 
far more accurate and holistic financial picture of a bank than today’s destructive 
and misleading system of accounting (ISAAC 2008, p.8).” 
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In particular, this group’s comment letters show concerns for the quality of the underlying 
accounting documents. Their view is that fair value accounting produces financial statements 
with low levels of reliability and understandability. Also, some comment letters go as far as 
stating that they believe that fair value accounting violates every logical decision of a going 
concern business. And this group’s opinions reflect a clear preference for historical cost 
accounting.  
 
4.2.3 Alternatives 
 
The alternatives group takes a rather critical opinion on fair value accounting without expressing 
the opinion to switch back to historical cost accounting. Their opinion about the fair value 
accounting concept is rather positive in good times while at the same time it clearly highlights 
the inherent flaws in fair value accounting in bad times. The comments below come from the 
users and preparers group and the comment letters are from Jason Edgtton and Wardell. 
 
“The effects of mark-to-market accounting on financial reporting by financial 
institutions in times of fear may well enhance short term negativity in the market 
and lead to extream results as clearly seen recently. However in a stable market, 
the mark-to-market accounting principle provides critical information to the 
investment community as to the current asset quality (Edgtton 2008, p.1).” 
 
“In times of extream volatility it would seem to be a good idea to question the 
usefulness of mark-to-market accounting, however just because the truth hurts is no 
excuse to hide it. However, one aspect to improve could involve placing a maximum 
percentage decline that could be taken against the relevant assets in any one 
quarter. This would have the effect of spreading the bad news over a longer period, 
reducing the panic and lowering the volatility in any given quarter (Edgtton 2008, 
p.1).” 
 
“The unprecedented market conditions that currently exist highlight the inherent 
flaws in fair value accounting. Utilizing net realizable value is a more appropriate 
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measurement for debt securities that are classified as or available-for-sale, and as 
the basis for recognizing other-than-temporary impairments (Wardell 2008, p.1).” 
 
The comment letters of this group go as far as suggesting areas to be looked at, but they shy 
away from drastic actions. This group rather suggests a detailed investigation of the existing 
flaws instead of jumping to conclusions right away. For example some letters that come from the 
preparer group state things like the quote below: 
 
“In light of that, we strongly encourage the SEC to conduct a thorough study of the 
effects of suspending mark-to-market. Like others, we are uncertain what the effect 
would be on the financial marketplace if mark-to-market accounting is suspended 
across the board. However, we do feel it is critical that the SEC consider, in a 
comprehensive manner, the result that changes in the language and application of 
fair value principles would have in light of the current vagaries that result from the 
present market (Dunn 2008, p.1).”  
 
The letters that made it into this group provided the reader with a more critical view of the 
current accounting treatments while maintaining the overall consensus for the current fair value 
accounting treatments. This group distinguishes itself from the opponents of fair value in the fact 
that even though they criticize and express doubts about fair value, their opinions are mainly 
influenced by the current events. Also, this group does not favor the historical cost accounting 
nor does it support fair value accounting in bad times.   
 
4.2.4 Supporters of Fair Value 
 
As the name implies, this group is clearly positive to the concept of fair value accounting. The 
comment letter’s that are used speak favorably of fair value and support their opinions by 
reflecting on the possible effects that would be caused by the removal of fair value accounting. 
For example G. Peter Wilson, an academic from Boston College, says:  
 
“These wide confidence intervals, which result from uncertainty in the marketplace 
associated with a dearth of predictive information, reflect and partly contribute to 
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our current crisis of confidence. This does not mean fair-value accounting should 
be suspended. Doing so will surely increase outsiders’ uncertainty about the related 
assets’ future cash flows, which will further depress their estimates of the assets’ 
fair values and delay a recovery (Wilson 2008, p.5)” 
 
Also, this group’s comment letters argue that if it were not for fair value, management’s 
questionable performance would lead into more problems. In addition, their views were that 
management’s integrity would be compromised without fair vale accounting. These views are 
found in the preparer group by Jay Michalowski from Sleeping Bear Partners in the below quote: 
 
“However enticing and difficult this procedure has been, retracting FASB 157 
would only service to delay the evitable, encourage corporate lying and make us 
repeat the mistakes made by Japan with their unwillingness to address their non-
performing loan problems (Michalowski 2008, p.1).” 
 
“FASB 157 has no doubt caused pain in the banking system. But let’s remember, 
the pain originated from the poor decisions of bankers, and exacerbated further 
from the imprecision and lack of FASB 157 enforcement. Current strains are 
occurring from the resulting “good bank / bad bank” weeding out process. In such, 
now is the time to be even more resolute (Michalowski 2008, p.1).” 
 
Certain other argument’s reflected the opinions that fair value accounting brings the benefits of 
comparability, relevance and transparency. This group portrays the opinion that despite the 
possible glitches fair value accounting still gives more value to users of financial information. 
For example in the comment letter that is found in the user’s group that is from the Center for 
Audit Quality, the CFA Institute, the Consumer Federation of America, the Council of 
Institutional Investors and the Investment Management Association says: 
 
“In the specific case of fair value reporting, investors require an accounting 
standard that reports a relevant and useful value of financial instruments 
regardless of the direction of markets. Fair value accounting with robust 
disclosures provides more reliable, timely, and comparable information than 
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amounts that would be reported under other alternative accounting approaches 
(Fornelli et al 2008, p.2).” 
 
This group of comment letters was grouped on the positive opinions for the fair value concept in 
addition to providing the different interest groups with relevant, reliable and transparent financial 
information.  
 
4.2.5 Public Interest Opinion Group 
 
The public interest opinion group’s views are rather more positive to the concept of Fair Value, 
but they distinguish themselves from the supporters of fair value through their extensive 
opinion’s and suggestions. While this group supports the concepts of fair value they still have 
rather extensive modifications that they would like to see fairly quickly. A good example of this 
group is the following quote from our preparer group: 
 
”We believe the current application and interpretation of Statements 157 and 115 
to Banking Institutions whose primary business model is to operate as a going 
concern with a longer term time horizon has resulted in unintended consequences. 
The strict restrictions on transferability and the requirement to measure impaired 
securities for which the institution has no immediate plans for sale on a liquidation 
or “exit” price notion is more relevant to active traders versus financial institutions 
such as Banks. Therefore, we feel that certain targeted amendments to the US 
GAAP impairment guidelines for available-for-sale (AFS) and held-to-maturity 
(HTM) debt instruments should be considered (Traficanti 2008, p.1).”  
 
This groups proposals for modifications call for fair value accounting to be required for all 
financial instruments because they hold the opinion that the reporting would be substantially 
improved. They also propose that further modifications of statement 157 should focus even more 
on requiring additional disclosures. In addition to increased disclosures they would like to be 
able to reclassify their assets according to the management’s intent. The comment letters in this 
group are comprised out of strong supporters for the concept of fair value accounting while 
proposing robust changes other than to the recent guidelines (IASB Expert Advisory Panel, 
36 
 
2008, SEC, 2008). Also, these letters attempt to explain in a rather extensive manner their 
recommendations and their reasons for it.   
 
4.2.6 Modifiers due to economic consequences 
 
The Modifiers due to economic consequences group is a supporter of the fair value concept, but 
it strongly urges for modifications. The comment letters in this group generally believe that the 
fair value accounting accomplishes the goals of relevant, reliable and transparent financial 
information when they are under normal market conditions. Also, they all share the opinion that 
once the market becomes dislocated and illiquid, fair value accounting becomes problematic. 
They believe that illiquid market condition can result in misleading information and results that 
do not reflect the underlying transactions. The letters also reflect the views in illiquid markets 
and the securities fair values do not show the true economic value or for that matter a “true” fair 
value of the perspective investments. The comments that were grouped in this group can be 
shown in the following example by Richard A. Dorfman from a preparer from FHL Bank of 
Atlanta: 
 
“A significant amount of financial institutions’ lending capacity is being diminished 
not by economic losses, but by technical accounting rules (Dorfman 2008, p.2).” 
 
“Subsequently, financial institutions are often forced to sell investment assets at 
distressed prices to raise funding. This ultimately further distorts fair values 
reported by other entities (Dorfman 2008, p.2).”  
 
The comment letters go even further so far as to give recommendations to what modifications 
they want to see in the near future. Also, Dorfman for example says: 
 
“For held-to-maturity securities, modify the accounting rules for other-than-
temporary impairment recognition to be more closely aligned with the discounted 
cash flow guidance found in Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 114, 
Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a Loan.  Doing so would better 
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correlate the accounting treatment with the true economic loses and the nature of 
held-to-maturity securities (Dorfman 2008, p.2).” 
 
“Allow for the recovery in fair value of previously impaired securities to be 
recognized as realized gains. This would align the other-than-temporary 
accounting model closer to fair value concepts and eliminate the downward bias in 
the current accounting model (Dorfman 2008, p.2).” 
 
“Direct the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to issue more specific 
audit guidance related to other-than-temporary impairment and fair value.  In some 
instances auditors have advised companies to be more than conservative in their 
fair value methodology. More specific audit guidance would help provide a more 
consistent audit approach (Dorfman 2008, p.2).”  
 
This group is a very active in the debate and in certain comment letter’s goes even deeper when 
giving recommendations to modifications of fair value accounting. But the comment letters that 
suggest modification’s and give recommendations were separated according to which opinions 
lead to or imply modifications that arose due to economic consequences.  
 
4.2.7 Modifiers for other reasons 
 
The group Modifiers for other reasons is also a supporter of fair value and it also urges 
modifications, but its motives arose out of reasons other than economic consequences. This 
group always clearly states the opinion about whether fair value accounting is to be blamed for 
the financial crisis and then it goes into giving their opinion about potential consequences if fair 
value was not there. For example the opinions are stated like this can be found in the comment 
letter from users Nigel Hyde and Marcus Schüler from Markit: 
 
“To be clear, mark-to-market accounting has not caused any losses, it has only 
been the "messenger", as institutions were forced to acknowledge and reveal write-
downs in a timely and transparent fashion. Any alternative or move away from the 
concept of fair value risks encouraging institutions to not reveal the true extent of 
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their potential problems. It would thus make the necessary adjustment process more 
prolonged and more painful for everyone. We are strongly in favor of adhering to 
the true concept of mark-to-market to determine the current valuation of a financial 
product for accounting purposes (Hyde & Schüler 2008, p. 2).” 
 
In addition to urging modifications to fair value and supporting the concept of fair value this 
group also goes further and wants the current crisis examined even further. A good example of 
that is from Vincent Colman an auditor from PriceWaterouseCoopers LLP: 
 
“We also encourage the Commission and others to undertake a constructive review 
of the root causes of the credit crisis. Understanding the root causes will help in 
determining any necessary reforms, including those that go beyond accounting and 
financial reporting (Colman 2008, p.1).” 
 
As the previous group, this group also consists out of comment letters that gives 
recommendations of in which direction the fair value accounting needs to be modified. The 
difference between the previous group and this group is that this group proposal does not 
reference the financial crisis when talking about the modifications. Also Colman states:  
 
“Lastly, we support exploring possible refinements in fair value reporting, and the 
related disclosures of fair value measurements. Specifically, in the near term, we 
believe there are several areas that could be evaluated in regard to reporting 
periodic changes in fair value, without compromising the core principles of fair 
value measurement. These include:  
 
1. Consider separating for accounting purposes the periodic changes in fair value 
into two components: (1) incurred credit losses and (2) all other changes in fair 
value (including, for example, liquidity discounts).  
 
2. Consider converging the guidance for reporting financial asset impairments by 
recognizing (1) incurred credit losses in income and (2) all other changes in fair 
value in other comprehensive income until the asset is sold or matures.  
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3. Consider changes in the format of the income statement to allow for (1) more 
visibility to the income effects of items reported at fair value and (2) the inclusion of 
other comprehensive income on the face of the statement (Colman 2008, p.1).” 
 
The comment letters that came from this group represent the supporters of the concept of fair 
value accounting that do not assign blame to accounting for the financial crisis, but still ask for 
modifications. The requested modification and recommendations are rather superficial changes 
than changes that were motivated for purely economic reasons.  
 
In summary, this chapter goes deeper into the description and criteria for each of our main and 
opinion groups. While describing each of the criteria, the paper gives examples for the reader in 
order to better understand the groupings. The next chapter analyzes our study of the comment 
letters. 
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5. ANALYSIS 
This Chapter is concerned with relations between the main groups and the seven opinion groups.  
Also, it attempts to analyze the arguments used in the debate. 
 
5.1 Relation between Main Groups and Opinion Groups 
 
In the previous Chapter the main groups and the opinion groups were described in detail in two 
separate sections because these two groups were classified independently from each other.  The 
question in our study is whether the opinion groups’ arguments can reveal any differences in 
which kind of arguments different opinion groups use. This section will explain the patterns we 
found about how the opinion groups are arguing. Once such concerns are found, this section 
becomes specifically interesting in revealing whether there is a pattern in concerns within, as 
well as across the opining groups.  The table below serves as a base for the analysis. In the table 
the left vertical columns represent the different opinion groups and the right horizontal rows 
represent the different main groups.  
 
 
 
5.2 View’s of Alternatives opinion group  
 
The alternative group is by far the biggest opinion group (47.7%) and users represent more than 
half of the group. The alternative group arguing to a big extent the same way as opponents but 
they don’t promote a historical cost model. They argue that fair value accounting should either 
be blamed for the financial crisis, or with its perceived procyclicality effects contributed to it. 
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Consequently, the predominant view among this group is that SFAS 157 should be suspended. 
However, some of the comment letters develop the arguments on the reasons why they view Fair 
Value accounting as economically harmful. Some of the commentators point out that fair value 
accounting is based on the wrong premise; that the market value is the most accurate reflection 
of an asset. They argue that the market efficient theory doesn’t always hold on in reality and that 
prices can be manipulated, especially in illiquid markets. Several commentators argue that a 
discounted cash flow model should be a better measurement basis than market value. They 
believe a value based on estimation of future cash flow is more relevant than the market value of 
an instrument. The reason is that if the current market value produces a lower return, companies 
will likely hold the instrument. In a depressed, inactive market the management’s estimate of 
future cash flow is likely to be more relevant in the estimation of current fair value. Furthermore, 
some of the comment letters argue that Fair Value accounting seriously contradicts the going 
concern premise, and one comment letter even suggest that Fair Value accounting is a perfect 
model in societies where there is no tomorrow. There are commentators that think Fair Value 
accounting exaggerated the “real economic losses”, arguing that only 2% of the real estate 
properties in US are in a foreclosure but market values are down to nothing caused by enormous 
write-downs.  
 
5.3 View’s of Supporter’s of Fair Value opinion group 
 
The supporters of Fair Value are about 16.5% of the whole 218 comment letters that were 
analyzed. This group is the second largest group after the alternatives opinion group.  This 
group’s views support fair value accounting and strongly oppose any suspensions of fair value 
accounting. Their opinions are not different across the different main groups because all the main 
groups believe that fair value is beneficial during normal market conditions. They share the view 
that fair value accounting is the best option even when in times of a financial crisis these 
accounting treatments show weaknesses. The view is that fair value accounting is the best 
alternative because it has a higher transparency and they reflect more accurately the economic 
reality of the underlying assets and liabilities. Also, this group believes that a suspension of the 
standards will only lead to a decrease in transparency that will increase investors’ concerns about 
the reliability of the financial information and ultimately eroding the market conditions even 
further. 
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5.4 View’s of Modifier’s for other reasons opinion group  
 
The Modifier’s for other reasons represents about 10.6% of the pooled comment letters. This 
group supports the fair value concept and does not believe that fair value caused or contributed to 
the current financial crisis. Also, this group does ask for modifications, but the modifications are 
not driven by the economic consequences that arose during the crisis. All of the four main groups 
agree and relate to the argument for modification in other areas. In addition to that all three 
groups respond by making suggestions on what they want to see changed. All the main groups 
agree one particular change. They all address a change where it would be allowed to reclassify 
assets out of the fair value through profit and loss category if there is a clear change in business 
intent to hold the instruments as a result of the lack of market liquidity. In addition to these 
changes the different main groups ask for other changes as well. For example the standard setters 
group is a supporter of fair value accounting, but it strongly proposes changes to the accounting 
treatment. They believe that a couple of issues need to be addressed as soon as possible if 
improvement is there to be made. For example one of the comment letters came from Jorgen 
Holmquist from the European Commission of Internal Market and Services DG. In his comment 
letter he says that on October 21 the European Commission had organized a meeting with 
European Stakeholders, which included representatives of preparers, investors, auditors and 
regulators, where they emphasized the need for change to the problems that arose during the 
financial crisis. One of the issues that they addressed was the need for clarification on whether 
the synthetic CDOs include embedded derivatives (Holmquist 2008). In addition to the already 
mentioned they talk about adjustments to impairment rules that are applicable to the available-
for-sale financial assets (Holmquist 2008). As for the users they suggest that the fair value 
hierarchy be amended to require that the company take into account both market price and the 
discounted present value of the estimated cash flows (Dicke 2008). The preparers on the other 
hand, they want further enhancements and improvements to the transparency through the use of 
disclosures. The preparer groups also ask for modification in the approach to the reporting 
periodic changes in fair value and aligning the accounting guidance for loan impairments with 
the accounting guidance for impairments of debt securities. This group ultimately asks for other 
modifications that are not related to the economic consequences. In addition, the different 
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opinion group’s request changes that are influenced by their views of what is best for their area 
of business.  
 
5.5 View’s of the Irrelevant View opinion group  
 
As the name already suggests it the opinions that were included in these groups do not fit into the 
scope of our research, so they were separated into its own category. This category took up 8.7% 
of all the 218 comment letters that were analyzed. The letters in this group were not further 
analyzed because the different opinions went off topic and were not relevant to fair value 
accounting. But it comes to point out that one should exercise judgment when considering 
different views in their decision making process.  
 
5.6 View’s of Public Interest opinion group  
 
Preparers of financial statements are the predominant main group among this group. Almost 
every member of the public interest opinion group share the view that reclassifications between 
ASF, and HTM and Loans should be allowed. Their argument is that business intent and 
accounting have to be aligned. Further on, they oppose current rules for the impairment for HTM 
assets. Specifically, they do not believe it meets the required accounting characteristic of 
representational faithfulness. One common argument among this group is that if management has 
the intent and ability to hold investment securities until maturity, recognition of a loss based on 
the fair value in a distressed market will result in significant disparity between the accounting 
loss reported in the financial statements and the ultimate economic loss. They believe that only 
credit impairments should be recognized and not impairments due to lower market values. Some 
of the commentators also recommend the SEC to review auditor practices concerning these 
areas. The commentators are concerned that auditors are too conservative and have forced 
companies to exaggerate impairments.  
 
5.7 View’s of Opponents opinion group  
 
Among opponents, there is no single argument that can be said to be common for this group. We 
have found a strong relationship between users and this opinion group (9 out of 14). However, 
almost every comment letter in this group is arguing that the practice of fair value accounting is 
in some way economically harmful to either banks or the entire financial system or both. The 
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arguments used to reach the conclusion that fair value is economic harmful differs. One view is 
that fair value can be described as manipulation and intrigue modeling that threatens the credit 
system and the financial stability. Another view is that fair value concept is economically 
harmful because it fails the accounting qualities of faithful representation and comparability. The 
comment letter exemplifies two comparable companies in the same business, one that has poor 
management and one with excellent management. The credit rating on the first company will go 
down and the market value of their debt will decrease resulting in an increase in their 
shareholders’ equity. In our study, across all the main groups, the majority of the comment letters 
share the view that fair value accounting is dangerous to banks and that it creates and inherent 
procyclicality in the economy. According to this argument, fair value produces misleading 
results well below the true economic value when markets are not function properly. Distressed 
market prices doesn’t reflect the true economic values of securities, it’s just reflecting that there 
are a few very risk adverse willing buyers and lots of distressed sellers. Accordingly, even non-
distressed banks have to charge for impairment losses even though they are not intending to sell. 
The Pro-cyclical effect has been extremely destructive of bank capital and is a major cause of the 
economic crisis. Another comment letter uses the situation on the mortgage market as an 
argument. There are a lot of distressed sales of mortgage loans that are forced liquidations. These 
distressed sale prices are not indicative of the fair value of that property. In an illiquid market, it 
forces financial institutions to value these assets at prices that are less compared to its discounted 
cash flow. Another view is that fair value is economically harmful because it has incentives for 
short term actions. The argument is that fair value subordinates underlying tangible transactions 
by reassessing them through the marketplace. Large market shifts can overshadow the operating 
activities of a company. Since the management of a company makes decisions based on the 
relative impact it will have on the financial statements, they focus on the affect of their decisions 
on the market as opposed to the affect on operations.  
 
The opponents have also arguments of why historical cost is a better accounting model. Some of 
the comment letters have the view that the historical cost model meets the information needs of 
several interest groups but fair value is designated to meet a limited number of users interest. 
Another stated reason is that it doesn’t require as much judgment so the information is easier to 
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audit. One comment letter argued that companies don’t anticipate profits under the historical cost 
model; it leaves thinking about the future to the investors and their models.  
 
5.8 View’s of Modifier’s due to economic consequences opinion group 
 
The Modifier’s due to economic consequences group represents 4.1% of the whole 218 comment 
letters that were analyzed. Also, this opinion group represents the smallest percentage of the 
views that were represented in the pooled comment letters. These groups’ opinions are spread 
throughout the main groups of users, preparers and academics. All these main groups have a 
couple of arguments in common. They all argue that fair value accounting is not the root cause of 
the financial crisis, but it has intensified the problem further. Specifically they argue that the fair 
value accounting is flawed because it requires companies to value their assets at fair value no 
matter what the markets conditions are. But ultimately they all agree that a suspension of fair 
value may deepen the already horrible economic conditions.  
 
The users group listed different aspects of the current accounting treatments that can be 
improved. They mention that fair value accounting principles need to be tweaked and more 
adaptable to different economic conditions. Additionally, the provided guidelines and disclosures 
need to be increased as well as the use of good judgment during accounting need to be 
reemphasized. Also, possible solution to fair value accounting that was mentioned was to create 
a contra asset account that will grant the reporting of historical cost, or the change in the value of 
the asset that is causing the gain or loss for the company. In addition, it was proposed that the 
SEC should find a temporary solution to help the banks reevaluate their assets and then do not 
extend it once the crisis is over so that a close control on real asset value will be fairly disclosed 
in the financial reports. Patrick J Straka, an Chief Investment Officer and Economist of CIB, 
proposed to raise the meaning of liquidity risk premium used in determining a discount rate 
applied in the various Income Approaches using the present value models for deriving a fair 
market value. Academics on the other hand suggest that issues related to market participants 
influence over the valuation inputs need to be settled before fair value measurements can 
effectively increase financial transparency without unintended economic consequences. The 
preparers on the other hand, recommend that for the held-to-maturity securities the other than 
temporary impairment recognition be modified and be more closely aligned with the discounted 
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cash flow guidance. All these proposals are coming from supporters of fair value with the desire 
for a modified set of fair accounting treatments.  
 
In summary, we analyze the selected comment letter and try to find a relationship between the 
main and opinion groups. This relationship was examined through a table that was created by us 
while analyzing the subject area. At the same time it explains the different arguments that were 
used by the opinion groups. The next chapter we answer our research question and provide a 
prospective for future research.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter answers our research questions. . 
 
The purpose of this study is to gain understanding, through examination of comment letters of 
the current fair value debate during the financial crisis. The study in particular is interested in 
educating the reader about the different available opinions about the fair value debate within the 
financial crisis.  Using a case study of comment letters, our purpose is to examine the debate 
about fair value in accounting which has arisen in the context of the current financial crisis.  
 
-What major perceptions can be found in the fair value debate? 
-What types of arguments can be found in the comment letters? 
-Is there any relationship between the main groups and the opinion groups in the different 
comment letters that were sent to FASB, IASB and SEC? 
 
Specifically, this study is not trying to arrive at a general conclusion where thereafter the results 
can be applied to a sample of the population. This study rather tries to look into different opinion 
groups views behind the fair value debate within the current financial crisis and its main groups. 
We believe the most common argument used is that fair value accounting is dangerous to the 
economy and the financial stability. It is rare to find any argument relating to some kind of 
accounting theory or principles for measurement. As, the Accounting European Commissioner, 
Charlie McCreevy recently said:”Accounting is now far too important to be left solely to 
accountants!” He also said that EU finance ministers regarded the IASB as being “out of touch 
with today’s reality” with an approach to standard setting which was too academic. We think our 
study of the comment letters confirms the view of accounting as more and more a subject to 
politics. 
 
We believe there are surprisingly few "own arguments" in the debate. Especially, we think this 
aspect is more common to the different opinion groups that oppose fair value accounting. A lot 
of commentator’s just state already existing and well known arguments on why fair value 
accounting is dangerous for the economy. For example, the alternatives (around half the total 
number of comment letters) provided maybe 5, 6 different arguments on why fair value 
48 
 
accounting is dangerous and should be suspended and just 2 of them provided their own 
argumentation of what alternative accounting model or measurement basis should be used. We 
also find it surprising to just find 4.1% of the comment letters categorized as modifiers due to 
economic consequences. It seems like the different opinion groups supporting the fair value 
accounting concept, don’t use economic reasons for their argumentation to the same extent as the 
different opponents groups do. For example, there are 23 Modifiers for other reasons but only 9 
Modifiers due to economic consequences. Among the alternatives, nearly every comment letter 
argument is made with reference to economic consequences and financial stability.  
 
In particular, the question in our study is whether the arguments in the opinion groups’ reveal 
any relation to the main groups in the fair value accounting debate. According to our study, there 
seem to be some relationship between main groups and opinion groups. The users are the 
dominant main group among opponents, alternatives and irrelevant views. The preparers are the 
dominant main group among the public interest opinion group. Moreover, we were surprised that 
50% of the auditors were strong supporters according to our flow chart study. One can think that 
auditors would prefer a historical cost accounting model since it should be a lot more difficult to 
audit fair values. 
 
The major conclusion that can be drawn from the study is that there is no strong relationship 
between the main groups and the opinion groups. All the different opinion groups share the main 
view that fair value accounting needs improvements and major changes. These views and the 
expert debate can easily be looked at as a way to add to the already existing political pressures.  
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7. POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This chapter presents the possibilities for future research that arose while researching this topic. 
 
Every time there is a crisis we can generally assume that politics will play a role in it. During this 
particular crisis it has become even more evident since the crisis escalated into a global one and 
every side has different views and opinions. So, with the political pressure in existence the fair 
value debate was not excluded from it. A good example of that is when the IASB came under 
pressure from the European Commission, as well as the French and German governments, to 
loosen up the IAS 39 standard (Anonymous, 2009). On the other hand, FASB was pressured by 
the Congress to relax the SFAS No. 157 standard on fair value and mark-to-market accounting 
(Anonymous, 2009). The pressure that is being exerted on the two standard-setting bodies leaves 
one wondering if in the near future the consequences will be more than we can bear. Could it 
lead to an un-leveled playing field as the Chairman of IASB Sir David Tweedie states 
(Anonymous, 2009)? Also, all the politics distracts us from the fact that the profession needs 
high quality improvements to the fair value accounting standards. Instead of focusing on the 
politics, one should put more energy into the improvement of the current situations within fair 
value.  
 
One of the suggestions for improvements of the current problems with fair value came from 
Germany. The German’s adopted a bank rescue plan that would be voluntary. This plan would 
allow a bank to set up its own bad bank. The word “bad bank” does not mean a real bank; it 
rather refers to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or also sometimes referred to as companies 
where junk securities would be dumped (Münchau, 2009). In this particular plan troubled banks 
will be able to swap their toxic debt for government-backed bonds in return for paying an annual 
fee. These government-backed bonds will be given 90%t of the value of the toxic assets and they 
will be stored for up to 20 years (Ibid). The idea behind the bad bank is that these problem assets 
or toxic assets would be stored in those “bad banks” and frozen (BBC.com). So after the crisis 
these toxic assets would be re-evaluated if they can still be sold (Ibid). The main idea behind this 
plan is that banks would be given incentives to lend again and with that resolve the liquidity 
issues (Münchau, 2009). This particular proposal sounds interesting, but ultimately it should be 
further researched. It could be researched if this plan would work or if it would only be an 
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accounting trick. Also, another potential research area could be if the bad bank plan from 
Germany could yield positive results and if it is possible to implement it in the United States. In 
conclusion, it is time to explore more alternative solutions to our problems instead of just playing 
a political game that only goes in circles with no potential prospects for a concrete solution.  
   
APPENDIX 
 
Comment Letters 
 
  
Commenter Abbreviation Date Weblink 
          
  
Group: Preparers 
      
          
  
II. Preparers - This group includes preparers, 
preparer-related professional organizations, 
and advisors to preparers. 
      
1 Allianz   2008-10-10 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/F319D7A3-
5A83-4D61-B3AA-
6F4AA1E426A8/0/10Allianz.pdf 
2 Air France-KLM   2008-11-12 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/0539DEBA-
0468-4DCA-B647-E83F004E421C/0/13AFKL.pdf 
3 Association of Corporate Credit Union ACCU 2008-10-28 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-87.pdf 
4 BNP Paribas BNP 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-148.pdf 
5 BridgePointe Advisors BridgePoint 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-161.htm 
6 BridgePointe Advisors BridgePoint 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-156.htm 
7 British Bankers’ Association   2008-09-30 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/778064F3-
6F5D-4176-A002-2C67AD8B0E3D/0/02BBA.pdf 
8 Caisse d’Epargne   2008-10-02 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/9C906D33-
9D5C-467B-9ABE-
6AC2D38282BF/0/03CaissedEpargne.pdf 
9 Cannon Company Cannon 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-162.htm 
10 Citigroup Citi 2008-11-12 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-128.pdf 
11 Corporate One Federal Credit Union 
Corporate 
One 2008-10-28 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-91.pdf 
12 European Banking Federation   2008-10-03 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/1231F3B2-
D144-4BD2-8AF1-348E3B376D75/0/07EBF.pdf 
13 European Financial Services Roundtable   2008-10-13 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/961EFA43-
349E-4CCA-B5EF-4A3284B7EC27/0/12EFR.pdf 
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14 European Insurance CFO Forum   2008-10-10 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/01F24592-
0E62-4715-956C-
DAA0822B227D/0/08CFOForum10Oct08.pdf 
15 European Insurance CFO Forum   2008-10-30 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/D902C447-
B122-4108-B86F-
F4CEE29A68A6/0/09CFOForum30Oct08.pdf 
16 Credit Suisse Group Credit Suisse 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-165.pdf 
17 Eagle National Bank Eagle 2008-10-01 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-37.pdf 
18 Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta FHLBA 2008-11-26 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-180.pdf 
19 Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago FHLBC 2008-11-12 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-127.pdf 
20 First Federal of Bucks County 
Bucks 
County 2008-11-10 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-178.pdf 
21 Highland Capital Management, Highland 2008-10-23 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-58.pdf 
22 Houlihan Lokey Houlihan 2008-11-11 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-122.pdf 
23 Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer   2008-10-02 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/1D7D981B-
9FB0-4E37-AFFA-
F53292E3D064/0/05IDW2Oct08.pdf 
24 Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer   2008-10-27 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/D79A0448-
6D1A-4A27-972B-
1C0022372045/0/06IDW27Oct08.pdf 
25 Integrated Planning Strategies, LLC IPS 2008-10-30 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-104.pdf 
26 Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company MassMutual 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-155.pdf 
27 MBIA, Inc. MBIA 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-167.pdf 
28 Members United Corporate Federal Credit Union 
Members 
United 2008-10-17 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-41.pdf 
29 Nationwide Insurance Group Nationwide 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-157.pdf 
30 Providence Health & Services Providence 2008-11-10 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-143.pdf 
31 Sleeping Bear Partners 
Sleeping 
Bear 2008-10-01 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-18.pdf 
32 Southwest Corporate Federal Credit Union Southwest 2008-10-24 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-74.pdf 
33 Square 1 Bank Square 1 2008-10-08 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-70.pdf 
34 SunCorp Corporate Credit Union SunCorp 2008-10-27 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-80.pdf 
35 SunCorp Corporate Credit Union SunCorp 2008-11-12 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-133.pdf 
36 U.S. Central Central 2008-10-27 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-78.pdf 
37 U.S. Central Central 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-152.pdf 
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38 Western Corporate Federal Credit Union WesCorp 2008-10-24 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-73.pdf 
39 Western Reserve Capital Management Western 2008-07-25 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-171.pdf 
40 Western Reserve Capital Management Western 2008-09-25 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-172.pdf 
41 Xylos Corporation Xylos 2008-12-05 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-186.pdf 
     
  
Group:  Auditors  
    
  
 
  
        
  
III. Auditors - This group includes auditors. 
      
42 Barret Peterson   2008-12-23 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/53055.pdf 
43 Frank Lasaracina   2008-12-23 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/53056.pdf 
44 Larissa R. Taylor   2008-12-28 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/53160.pdf 
45 PricewatherhouseCoopers LLP PwC 2008-10-29 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-90.pdf 
46 PricewatherhouseCoopers LLP PwC 2008-10-01 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-1.pdf 
          
  
Group: Standard Setters 
      
          
  
IV. Standard-Setters - This group includes 
standard-setters and related formal and 
informal advisory groups. 
      
47 Conseil National de la Comptabilité   2008-10-09 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/3268A22C-
80F4-409B-A202-337588591844/0/04CNC.pdf 
48 European Commission   2008-10-27 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/FD140082-
0E3D-4683-95B0-
E435D4798AC0/0/11EuropeanCommission.pdf 
49 Financial Accounting Foundation FAF 2008-10-02 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-84.pdf 
50 Financial Accounting Foundation FAF 2008-10-27 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-83.pdf 
51 International Valuation Standards  Committee IVSC 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-145.pdf 
          
  
Group: Academics 
      
          
  
V. Academics - This group includes 
academics. 
      
52 Angel, James J. Georgetown 2008-11-12 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-135.pdf 
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53 Columbia Business School Columbia 2008-10-31 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-105.pdf 
54 Gorton, Donald Gorton 2008-10-28 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-89.htm 
55 Grayson, Michael Academic 2009-03-16 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/53631.pdf 
56 Landsman, Wayne R. Landsman 2008-11-21 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-169.pdf 
57 Ryan, John Ryan 2008-10-28 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-81.pdf 
58 Smith, David and Webinger, Mariah UN-L 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-149.htm 
59 Waller, William Ph.D. Waller 2008-10-23 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-62.htm 
60 Wilson, Peter G. Wilson 2008-10-29 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-94.pdf 
          
  
Group: Users 
      
          
  
VI. Consultants - This group includes 
consulting firms engaged in, among other 
things, the use of fair value in financial 
reporting. 
      
61 BankLogic.Net, CPA's & Consultants BankLogic 2008-11-03 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-126.pdf 
62 Markit Group Limited Markit 2008-11-12 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-123.pdf 
63 New World Actuaries New World 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-137.htm 
64 Partnership Consultants, Inc. 
Partnership 
Consultants 2008-10-23 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-60.pdf 
65 Towers Perrin Towers 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-164.pdf 
          
  
VII. Professional Organizations - This group 
includes accounting and finance professional 
organizations with broad-based membership, 
as well as informal professional groups. 
      
66 American Bankers Association ABA 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-158.pdf 
67 American Bankers Association ABA 2008-09-23 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-38.pdf 
68 American Bankers Association ABA 2008-10-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-19.pdf 
69 American Council of Life Insurers ACLI 2008-10-30 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-103.pdf 
70 American Council of Life Insurers ACLI 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-153.pdf 
71 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants AICPA 2008-11-11 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-119.pdf 
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72 
Appraisal Institute and American Society of Farm 
Managers and Rural Appraisers AI/ASFMRA 2008-11-07 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-125.pdf 
73 BAI CFO Roundtable BAI 2008-12-03 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-194.pdf 
74 C&J Valuation Advisors   2008-10-01 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/52630.pdf 
75 Capital Group Companies, Inc.   2008-05-21 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/52081.pdf 
76 Center for Audit Quality CAQ 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-151.pdf 
77 
Center for Audit Quality, CFA Institute, Consumer 
Federation of America, Council of Institutional 
America, Council of Institutional Investors, and 
Investment Management Association Joint 2008-11-14 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-175.pdf 
78 
Center for Audit Quality, CFA Institute, Consumer 
Federation of America, Council of Institutional 
America, Council of Institutional Investors Joint 2008-10-15 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-65.pdf 
79 Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness CCMC 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-154.pdf 
80 Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness CCMC 2008-09-26 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-3.pdf 
81 Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness CCMC 2008-10-14 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-160.pdf 
82 Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness CCMC 2008-09-28 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/52644.pdf 
83 Commercial Mortgage Securities Association CMSA 2008-10-22 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-64.pdf 
84 Community Bankers Association of Illinois CBAI 2008-10-08 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-98.pdf 
85 Credit Union National Association CUNA 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-166.pdf 
86 Financial Services Roundtable Roundtable 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-142.pdf 
87 Independent Bankers Association of Texas IBAT 2008-10-08 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-97.pdf 
88 Independent Bankers of Colorado IBC 2008-10-16 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-69.pdf 
89 Independent Community Bankers of America ICBA 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-147.pdf 
90 InFRE Retirement Resource Center InFRE 2008-11-10 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-115.htm 
91 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales ICAEW 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-146.pdf 
92 International Corporate Governance Network ICGN 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-139.pdf 
93 International Corporate Governance Network   2008-10-30 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/0D524FAC-
29CF-42F7-BD24-4010BBAF7D60/0/14ICGN.pdf 
94 Investment Adviser Association IAA 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-141.pdf 
95 Investment Company Institute ICI 2008-11-14 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-173.pdf 
96 Missouri Independent Bankers Association MIBA 2008-10-08 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-99.pdf 
97 Mortgage Bankers Association MBA 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-140.pdf 
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98 
National Association of State Boards of 
Accountancy NASBA 2008-10-27 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-85.pdf 
99 Pennsylvania Association of Community Bankers PACB 2008-10-16 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-71.pdf 
100 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Financial Services 
Roundtable, Property Casualty Insurers 
Association of America, American Council of Life 
Insurers, Mortgage Bankers Association, and 
American Insurance Association Joint II 2008-10-23 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-61.pdf 
          
  
VIII. Investor and Other Users - This group 
includes individual investors and other users, 
investor groups, investor protection agencies, 
and attorneys representing users. 
      
101 American Investor 
American 
Investor 2008-10-09 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-7.htm 
102 Anderson, Arthur T. A. Anderson 2008-11-04 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-110.htm 
103 Anderson, David V. D. Anderson 2008-10-20 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-50.htm 
104 Anderson, Marcia  User 2009-03-18 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/53628.pdf 
105 Anonymous Citizen Anonymous 2008-11-12 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-130.htm 
106 Anonymous Citizen Anonymous II 2008-12-10 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-191.htm 
107 Armstrong, Ronald Armstrong 2008-09-30 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-33.htm 
108 Baldwin, Timothy L. Baldwin 2008-10-08 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-6.htm 
109 Barr, Robert W.   2009-03-15 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/53633.pdf 
110 Benson, Robert Benson 2008-11-12 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-124.htm 
111 Bjork, Ruth A Bjork 2008-11-11 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-120.htm 
112 Black, John G. Black 2008-10-28 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-77.htm 
113 Boggio, Phillip H.   2008-12-31 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/53370.pdf 
114 Boone, Irene Boone 2008-10-20 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-44.htm 
115 Bucalo, MaryAnn Bucalo 2008-11-07 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-163.htm 
116 Carl Carl 2008-10-22 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-56.htm 
117 Carmony, John Carmony 2008-10-09 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-26-08/s72608-
93.htm 
118 CFA Institute CFA 2008-10-01 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-36.pdf 
119 CFA Institute CFA 2008-11-11 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-118.pdf 
120 Ching, Hugh    2009-03-12 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/53634.pdf 
121 Cooper, Alan    2009-03-16 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/53632.pdf 
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122 Council of Institutional Investors CII 2008-10-29 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-95.pdf 
123 Council of Institutional Investors CII 2008-09-25 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-190.pdf 
124 Cox, David Cox 2008-10-28 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-86.htm 
125 Cross, Jeffery Cross 2008-10-06 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-5.htm 
126 Davis, Kurt E. Davis 2008-09-29 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-30.htm 
127 DuPont, James M. DuPont 2008-11-02 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-108.htm 
128 Edgtton, Jason Edgtton 2008-10-28 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-82.htm 
129 Etheridge, Chris Etheridge 2008-10-22 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-55.pdf 
130 Evans, Onex P. Evans 2008-10-28 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-72.pdf 
131 Evans, Scott Evans 2008-10-29 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-100.pdf 
132 Fastiggi, Jason Fastiggi 2008-10-29 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-93.htm 
133 Fischer, Urs P. Fischer 2008-11-06 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-113.htm 
134 Foster, Marc Foster 2008-10-25 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-76.htm 
135 Fuller, Brian H.   2009-03-17 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/53630.pdf 
136 Gichini, Brittany Gichini 2008-11-12 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-129.htm 
137 Grossman, Steve Grossman 2008-08-07 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-67.pdf 
138 Gueye, Khadid Gueye 2008-11-12 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-132.htm 
139 Hale, Jon Hale 2008-10-20 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-49.htm 
140 Haley, Jay Haley 2008-12-01 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-183.pdf 
141 Hamilton, Alexandra A. Hamilton 2008-12-02 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-181.htm 
142 Hamilton, Stephen W. Hamilton 2008-11-07 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-114.htm 
143 Harmon, David Harmon 2008-09-29 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-2.htm 
144 Haslem, Mark Haslem 2008-10-11 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-29.htm 
145 Hazen, Steven Hazen 2008-11-12 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-136.pdf 
146 Hodge, David Hodge 2008-10-09 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-9.htm 
147 Investors Technical Advisory Committee ITAC 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-159.pdf 
148 Investors Technical Advisory Committee ITAC 2008-05-23 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/52082.pdf 
149 Isaac, William M. Isaac 2008-10-29 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-79.pdf 
150 Jackson, Rembert Pendleton   2009-03-17 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/53629.pdf 
151 Jeremiah, Roger W. Jeremiah 2008-10-30 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-101.htm 
152 Keating, Patrick Keating 2008-09-30 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-35.htm 
153 Kent, David W. Kent 2008-10-11 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-15.htm 
154 King, William King 2008-10-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-16.htm 
155 Knorr, Thomas L. Knorr 2008-10-09 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-8.htm 
156 Lane, Chris C. Lane 2008-10-09 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-11.htm 
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157 Lane, Fred F. Lane 2008-11-09 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-116.htm 
158 Leavitt, Barbara Leavitt 2008-10-20 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-47.htm 
159 LeGuyader, Louis LeGuyader 2008-10-09 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-27.htm 
160 LeGuyader, Louis LeGuyader 2008-09-28 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-31.htm 
161 Levin, Douglas K. Levin 2008-11-17 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-168.htm 
162 Lofgreen, Shad Lofgreen 2008-11-21 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-174.htm 
163 Massey, Zara Massey 2008-10-25 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-75.htm 
164 McAllister, Teresa T. McAllister 2008-11-10 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-117.htm 
165 McAllister, Willis C. W. McAllister 2008-10-09 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-66.pdf 
166 Micheletti, Art Micheletti 2008-10-15 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-21.htm 
167 Miller, Jeffrey A. Miller 2008-10-28 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-92.htm 
168 Montroy, Vernon Montroy 2008-10-24 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-57.htm 
169 Morfesis, Alex G. Morfesis 2008-10-28 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-88.htm 
170 Murray, Lewis Murray 2008-10-14 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-20.htm 
171 Murray, Terry V.   2008-12-23 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/53062.pdf 
172 Napier, Jeff W.   2008-12-25 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/53064.pdf 
173 Nguyen, Dan J. Nguyen 2008-11-23 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-177.htm 
174 Oh, Lottie Oh 2008-10-23 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-59.htm 
175 Olson, Sue Olson 2008-10-10 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-28.htm 
176 O’Malley, Niall H. O'Malley 2008-12-12 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-192.pdf 
177 Owen, Daryle Owen 2008-10-15 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-23.htm 
178 Petersen, John L. Petersen 2008-10-17 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-40.htm 
179 Phillips, James E. Phillips 2008-10-18 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-43.htm 
180 Pierce, Steven Pierce 2008-09-30 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-4.htm 
181 Pigg, Gary L. Pigg 2008-10-20 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-46.htm 
182 Piper, Jason B. Piper 2008-10-09 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-12.htm 
183 Poweski, Mark Poweski 2008-09-30 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-34.htm 
184 Quigley, Peter Poweski 2008-11-19 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-170.htm 
185 Ramin, Kurt Paul Ramin 2008-11-12 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-134.pdf 
186 
Raz, Sharon, Gutierrez, Isabel, Huesler, Lukas, 
and Dias, Roy 
BUSL 
Students 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-150.pdf 
187 Rembert, Donald M. Rembert 2008-11-25 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-179.pdf 
188 Risgaard, David Rembert 2008-12-08 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-188.htm 
189 Rogers, Vincent Rodgers 2008-12-04 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-185.htm 
190 Rowley, Randy   2008-12-23 http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1201-UFM/53063.pdf 
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191 Saidens, Susan M. Saidens 2008-10-22 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-53.htm 
192 Schneider, Mark Schneider 2008-12-08 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-187.htm 
193 Schryer, Tom Schryer 2008-10-31 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-106.htm 
194 Schuler, Marcus Schuler 2008-10-20 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-48.pdf 
195 Sconyers, Richard Sconyers 2008-12-02 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-182.htm 
196 Sigmon, Michael Sigmon 2008-10-22 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-54.htm 
197 Smith, Gregory H. Smith 2008-11-01 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-107.htm 
198 Smith, Stephen T. S. Smith 2008-11-11 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-121.htm 
199 Spicer, Dave Spicer 2008-11-04 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-109.htm 
200 Steinbacher, Gunther Steinbacher 2008-10-20 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-45.htm 
201 Steinmetz, Charles T. Steinmetz 2008-11-05 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-112.htm 
202 Steward, Dan Steward 2008-10-24 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-63.htm 
203 Straka, Patrick J. Straka 2008-12-03 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-184.htm 
204 Strandt, W. Strandt 2008-10-21 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-52.htm 
205 Tarasuk, Brian H. Tarasuk 2008-10-30 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-102.htm 
206 Tchingambu, Delphine Tchingambu 2008-11-12 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-131.htm 
207 Urban, Walter Urban 2008-11-13 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-138.pdf 
209 Varley, Philip Varley 2008-10-30 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-96.htm 
210 Vetter, James Vetter 2008-10-21 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-51.htm 
211 Viets, Gilbert F. Viets 2008-11-05 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-111.htm 
212 Viets, Gilbert F. Viets 2008-11-23 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-176.htm 
213 Viets, Gilbert F. Viets 2008-12-15 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-195.htm 
214 von Kleist, Karsten Kleist 2008-10-16 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-39.htm 
215 Walker, Ray Walker 2008-09-30 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-32.htm 
216 Younger, Nancy Younger 2008-10-02 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-22.htm 
          
  
IX. Securities Information Processors - This 
constituency includes organizations that 
provide quotation services for securities. 
      
217 Pink OTC Markets Inc. Pink OTC 2008-10-02 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-193.pdf 
          
  
Group: Other public 
      
  
I. Members of Congress - This group includes 
members of Congress. 
      
218 Bachus, Spencer Bachus 2008-10-14 http://sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-68.pdf 
DEFINITIONS 
 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO’s): 
 
CDO's, or Collateralized Debt Obligations, are sophisticated financial tools that repackage 
individual loans into a product that can be sold on the secondary market. These packages consist 
of auto loans, credit card debt, or corporate debt. They are called collateralized because they 
have some type of collateral behind them.  
CDO's are called asset-backed commercial paper if the package consists of corporate debt and 
mortgage-backed securities if the loans are mortgages. If the mortgages are made to those with a 
less than prime credit history, they are called subprime mortgages. 
CDO's were created to provide more liquidity in the economy. It allows banks and corporations 
to sell off debt, which frees up more capital to invest or loan. The creation of CDO's is one 
reason why the U.S. economy has been so robust in the last five years. 
However, the downside of CDO's is that it allows the originators of the loans to avoid having to 
collect on them when they become due, since the loans are now owned by other investors. This 
may make them less disciplined in adhering to strict lending standards. 
Another downside is that they are so complex that often the buyers aren't really sure what they 
are buying. They often rely on their trust of the bank selling the CDO without doing enough 
research to be sure the package is really worth the price.  
The opaqueness and complexity of CDO's can cause a market panic if something happens to 
make sellers lose their trust in the product. This then makes the CDO's difficult to resell. This 
helped cause the 2007 Banking Liquidity Crisis. 
 
(http://useconomy.about.com/od/glossary/g/CDOs.htm) 
 
Synthetic CDO’s: 
 
A synthetic CDO involves the issue of securities by an issuer (typically a special purpose 
company), the return on which is determined by reference to the performance of a portfolio of 
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corporate loans or other similar debt obligations. The CDO is synthetic in the sense that the 
issuer need not hold the loan portfolio – there need not be a ‘physical’ portfolio of loans at all. 
The credit exposure – and return– is synthetically created by the issuer executing a credit default 
swap with a counterparty (typically the arranging bank) under which the counterparty pays the 
issuer a periodic (eg monthly) fee equivalent to an interest margin on a portfolio of notional 
loans made to publicly rated companies. In return, the issuer agrees to pay the counterparty 
principal losses if a company in the portfolio suffers a designated credit event (eg. Insolvency or 
default on its senior debt). The interest margin paid to the issuer generates part of the return to 
investors, enhancing their yield. If the portfolio suffers a principal loss, those losses flow through 
to investors (typically only once they reach an aggregate amount in excess of a first loss or 
‘protection amount’). In essence, the counterparty buys credit protection with respect to the 
portfolio of corporate loans. One of the great attractions for arrangers of synthetic CDOs is the 
ability to issue securities without actually owning any assets to back those securities. Essentially, 
they are able to look at investor demand and appetite for particular levels of risk and return, and 
create a synthetic asset, specifically tailored to meet investor demand. 
 
(http://www.aar.com.au/pubs/pdf/itm/jun04.pdf ) 
 
Derivatives: 
 
A security whose rice is dependent upon or derived from one or more underlying assets. The 
derivative itself is merely a contract between two or more parties. Its value is determined by 
fluctuations in the underlying asset. The most common underlying assets include tocks, bonds, 
commodities, currencies, interest rates and market indexes. Most derivatives are characterized by 
high leverage.  
 
Investopedia explains Derivative 
Futures contracts, forward contracts, options and swaps are the most common types of 
derivatives. Derivatives are contracts and can be used as an underlying asset. There are even 
derivatives based on weather data, such as the amount of rain or the number of sunny days in a 
particular region.  
Derivatives are generally used as an instrument to hedge risk, but can also be used 
for speculative purposes. For example, a European investor purchasing shares of an American 
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company off of an American exchange (using U.S. dollars to do so) would be exposed to 
exchange-rate risk while holding that stock. To hedge this risk, the investor could purchase 
currency futures to lock in a specified exchange rate for the future stock sale and currency 
conversion back into Euros. 
 
(http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/derivative.asp) 
 
Embedded Derivatives: 
 
A component of a hybrid security that is embedded in a non-derivative instrument. An embedded 
derivative can modify the cash flows of the host contract because the derivative can be related to 
an exchange rate, commodity price or some other variable which frequently changes. For 
example, a Canadian company might enter into a sales contract with a Chinese company, 
creating a host contract. If the contract is denominated in a foreign currency, such as the U.S. 
dollar, an embedded foreign currency derivative is created. According to the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the embedded derivative has to be separated from the host 
contract and accounted for separately unless the economic and risk characteristics of both the 
embedded derivative and host contract are closely related. 
(http://www.investorwords.com/7138/embedded_derivative.html) 
 
Toxic Assets: 
 
An asset that becomes illiquid when its secondary market disappears. Toxic assets cannot be 
sold, as they are often guaranteed to lose money. The term "toxic asset" was coined in the 
financial crisis of 2008/09, in regards to mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt 
obligations and credit default swaps, all of which could not be sold after they exposed their 
holders to massive losses. 
 
Investopedia explains Toxic Assets 
A toxic asset can be best described through an example: 
 
If John Doe buys a house and takes out a $400,000 mortgage loan with a 5% interest rate through 
Bank A, the bank now holds an asset – a mortgage-backed security. Bank A is now entitled to 
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sell the asset to another party (Bank B). Bank B, now the owner of an income-producing asset, is 
entitled to the 5% mortgage interest paid by John. As long as house prices go up and John 
continues to pay his mortgage, the asset is a good one. 
 
If, however, John defaults on his mortgage, the owner of the mortgage (whether Bank A or Bank 
B) will no longer receive the payments to which it is entitled. Normally, the house would then be 
sold, but if the house price has declined in value, only a portion of the money can be regained. 
As a result, the securities based on this mortgage become unsellable, as no other party would pay 
for an asset that is guaranteed to lose money. 
 
In this example, the mortgage-backed security becomes a toxic asset. 
 
(http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/toxic-assets.asp) 
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